



HOUSING FINANCE AT A GLANCE

A MONTHLY CHARTBOOK

September 2019

ABOUT THE CHARTBOOK

The Housing Finance Policy Center's (HFPC) mission is to produce analyses and ideas that promote sound public policy, efficient markets, and access to economic opportunity in the area of housing finance. *At A Glance*, a monthly chartbook and data source for policymakers, academics, journalists, and others interested in the government's role in mortgage markets, is at the heart of this mission.

We welcome feedback from our readers on how we can make *At A Glance* a more useful publication. Please email any comments or questions to ataglance@urban.org.

To receive regular updates from the Housing Finance Policy Center, please visit [here](#) to sign up for our bi-weekly newsletter.

HOUSING FINANCE POLICY CENTER STAFF

Laurie Goodman
Center Vice President

Alanna McCargo
Center Vice President

Edward Golding
Senior Fellow

Jim Parrott
Senior Fellow

Sheryl Pardo
Associate Director of Communications

Todd Hill
Policy Program Manager

Jun Zhu
Nonresident Fellow

Michael Neal
Senior Research Associate

Karan Kaul
Research Associate

Jung Choi
Research Associate

Sarah Strochak
Research Analyst

John Walsh
Research Assistant

Caitlin Young
Research Assistant

Alison Rincon
Director, Center Operations

CONTENTS

Overview

Market Size Overview

Value of the US Residential Housing Market	6
Size of the US Residential Mortgage Market	6
Private Label Securities	7
Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities	7

Origination Volume and Composition

First Lien Origination Volume & Share	8
---	---

Mortgage Origination Product Type

Composition (All Originations)	9
Percent Refi at Issuance	9

Cash-Out Refinances

Loan Amount After Refinancing	10
Cash-out Refinance Share of All Originations	10
Total Home Equity Cashed Out	10

Nonbank Origination Share

Nonbank Origination Share: All Loans	11
Nonbank Origination Share: Purchase Loans	11
Nonbank Origination Share: Refi Loans	11

Securitization Volume and Composition

Agency/Non-Agency Share of Residential MBS Issuance	12
Non-Agency MBS Issuance	12
Non-Agency Securitization	12

Credit Box

Housing Credit Availability Index (HCAI)

Housing Credit Availability Index	13
Housing Credit Availability Index by Channel	13-14

Credit Availability for Purchase Loans

Borrower FICO Score at Origination Month	15
Combined LTV at Origination Month	15
DTI at Origination Month	15
Origination FICO and LTV by MSA	16

Nonbank Credit Box

Agency FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank	17
GSE FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank	17
Ginnie Mae FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank	17
GSE LTV: Bank vs. Nonbank	18
Ginnie Mae LTV: Bank vs. Nonbank	18
GSE DTI: Bank vs. Nonbank	18
Ginnie Mae DTI: Bank vs. Nonbank	18

State of the Market

Mortgage Origination Projections & Originator Profitability

Total Originations and Refinance Shares	19
Originator Profitability and Unmeasured Costs	19

Housing Supply	
Months of Supply	20
Housing Starts and Home Sales	20
Housing Affordability	
National Housing Affordability Over Time	21
Affordability Adjusted for MSA-Level DTI	21
Home Price Indices	
National Year-Over-Year HPI Growth	22
Changes in CoreLogic HPI for Top MSAs	22
First-Time Homebuyers	
First-Time Homebuyer Share	23
Comparison of First-time and Repeat Homebuyers, GSE and FHA Originations	23
Delinquencies and Loss Mitigation Activity	
Negative Equity Share	24
Loans in Serious Delinquency/Foreclosure	24
Loan Modifications and Liquidations	24

GSEs under Conservatorship

GSE Portfolio Wind-Down	
Fannie Mae Mortgage-Related Investment Portfolio	25
Freddie Mac Mortgage-Related Investment Portfolio	25
Effective Guarantee Fees & GSE Risk-Sharing Transactions	
Effective Guarantee Fees	26
Fannie Mae Upfront Loan-Level Price Adjustment	26
GSE Risk-Sharing Transactions and Spreads	27-28
Serious Delinquency Rates	
Serious Delinquency Rates – Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, FHA & VA	29
Serious Delinquency Rates – Single-Family Loans & Multifamily GSE Loans	29

Agency Issuance

Agency Gross and Net Issuance	
Agency Gross Issuance	30
Agency Net Issuance	30
Agency Gross Issuance & Fed Purchases	
Monthly Gross Issuance	31
Fed Absorption of Agency Gross Issuance	31
Mortgage Insurance Activity	
MI Activity & Market Share	32
FHA MI Premiums for Typical Purchase Loan	33
Initial Monthly Payment Comparison: FHA vs. PMI	33

Related HFPC Work

Publications and Events	34
---	----


INTRODUCTION

HELOC debt outstanding falls to its lowest level since 2004

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York's Household Debt and Credit Report indicates that closed-end single-family residential mortgage debt outstanding (MDO) reached a new high of \$9.4 trillion in the second quarter of 2019, surpassing its previous peak level of \$9.3 trillion in 2008. In contrast, the outstanding amount of home equity lines of credit (HELOCs), which peaked at \$714 billion in 2009, continues to shrink, falling below \$400 billion for the first time since 2004.

Home equity lines of credit are typically originated by banks and the outstanding amounts tend to remain on their balance sheet, as opposed to getting securitized. Analysis of FDIC call report data in the figure below shows that both the rapid expansion during the housing boom and the steep decline in the years following was mostly concentrated among large banks, the top 20 banks in any given year.

Figure 1: HELOC Debt Outstanding and Net Charge-off Rate




Source: FDIC Statistics and Urban Institute calculations.

The decline in HELOC debt outstanding across large banks is partly reflected in tight lending standards at these banks. The most recent Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS) asked respondents to describe the current level of lending standards relative to the range of standards at their bank between 2005 and the present using the tightest and easiest points as reference points. These questions are meant to ascertain whether standards are “tight” or “easy”. Figure 2 below shows that the majority of large banks indicated that lending standards on HELOC loans remain tight, while the majority of other banks believed that standards were about average.

Figure 1 above shows that the net charge-off rate across the 20 largest banks in any year peaked at a rate double the experience across all other banks, 3.4 percent v. 1.7 percent in 2008. Since then, net charge-off rates have slowly converged to near zero. Tight lending standards can weigh on HELOC debt limiting originations.

Figure 2: Lending Standards on HELOCs Relative to the Range of Standards Since 2005



Source: Federal Reserve Board.

Demand for HELOCs also plays a role. A study by the Mortgage Bankers Association on home equity lending in 2018 found evidence of lower borrower sentiment for HELOCs due to such factors as worries around over-leveraging home equity and confusion over tax advantages. In addition, if a homeowner intended to refinance in today's rate environment, using cash-out refinancing, a substitute for HELOCs, allows them to extract housing equity and lock in a low fixed mortgage rate. Tapping housing equity with cash-out refinancings raises MDO instead of HELOC debt.

The continued decline in HELOC debt outstanding has contributed to the slow recovery across total mortgage debt outstanding (see page 6 of this chart book). In contrast, aggregate home values are at a record high. These dynamics have contributed to the growth of homeowners' equity as a share of total home values, which currently sits at 64 percent, 18 percentage points above the post-recession low reached in 2011. Conversely, total mortgage debt relative to home values, a measure of the loan-to-value ratio across all households, has fallen from 54 percent in 2011 to 36 percent today.

INSIDE THIS ISSUE


- Total value of the housing market reached \$30.6 trillion in the second quarter of 2019, 28.0 percent higher than the 2006 peak of \$23.9 trillion according to the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds report (page 6).
- Non-agency MBS issuance totaled \$19.24 billion in Q2 2019, significantly lower than the \$29.4 billion issued in the same period last year; a decline in scratch and dent securitizations accounted for most of the difference (page 12).
- Originator profitability reached \$2.62 per \$100 loan in August 2019, its highest point since January of 2017, reflecting falling rates resulting in capacity constrained lenders (page 19).

OVERVIEW


MARKET SIZE OVERVIEW

The Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds report has indicated a gradually increasing total value of the housing market driven by growing household equity since 2012, and 2Q 2019 was no different. While total mortgage debt outstanding was steady at \$11.0 trillion, household equity grew from \$16.6 trillion in Q1 2019 to \$19.7 trillion in Q2 2019, bringing the total value of the housing market to \$30.6 trillion, 28.0 percent higher than the pre-crisis peak in 2006. Agency MBS account for 62.2 percent of the total mortgage debt outstanding, private-label securities make up 4.1 percent, and unsecuritized first liens make up 28.9 percent. Second liens comprise the remaining 4.7 percent of the total.

Value of the US Housing Market



Size of the US Residential Mortgage Market




OVERVIEW


MARKET SIZE OVERVIEW

As of July 2019, debt in the private-label securitization market totaled \$354 billion and was split among prime (13.0 percent), Alt-A (33.7 percent), and subprime (53.2 percent) loans. In August 2019, outstanding securities in the agency market totaled \$6.8 trillion, 42.7 percent of which was Fannie Mae, 27.7 percent Freddie Mac, and 29.6 percent Ginnie Mae. Ginnie Mae has had more outstanding securities than Freddie Mac since May 2016.

Private-Label Securities by Product Type



Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities





OVERVIEW

ORIGINATION VOLUME AND COMPOSITION

First Lien Origination Volume

At the end of 1H 2019, first lien originations totaled \$920 billion, up from \$825 billion in 1H 2018. The share of portfolio originations was 40.2 percent in 1H 2019, up from 32.3 percent during the same period in 2018. The GSE share was down at 38.6 percent, compared to 43.9 percent in 1H 2018. The FHA/VA share was 18.7 percent, down from 21.9 percent. Private-label securitization at 2.1 percent was marginally higher than its 2.0 percent share in 1H 2018; it remains a fraction of its share in the pre-bubble years.




OVERVIEW

PRODUCT COMPOSITION AND REFINANCE SHARE

Adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) accounted for as much as 52 percent of all new originations during the peak of the housing bubble (top chart). The ARM share fell to an historic low of 1 percent in 2009, and then slowly increased to a high of 12 percent in December 2013. The June 2019 share of 3.2 percent is slightly higher than last month. The 15-year fixed-rate mortgage, predominantly a refinance product, accounted for 5.2 percent of new originations in June 2019. Since late 2018, while there has been some month-to-month variation, the refinance share (bottom chart) has generally grown for both the GSEs and Ginnie Mae as interest rates have dropped.

Product Composition




Sources: Black Knight, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA and Urban Institute.

June 2019

Note: Includes purchase and refinance originations.

Percent Refi at Issuance



Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.


Note: Based on at-issuance balance. Figure based on data from August 2019.

OVERVIEW

CASH-OUT REFINANCES

When mortgage rates are low, the share of cash-out refinances tends to be small, as refinancing allows borrowers to save money by taking advantage of lower rates. But when rates are high, the cash-out refinance share is higher since the rate reduction incentive is gone and the only reason to refinance is to take out equity. The cash-out share of all refinances fell from 76 percent in the first quarter of 2019 to 61 percent in the second quarter, reflecting increased rate-refi activity due to falling rates in 2019 Q2. Since June 2019, Freddie Mac's cash-out refinance share has sunk slightly below the FHAs. While the cash-out refinance share for conventional mortgages is close to bubble-era peak, equity take-out volumes are substantially lower.


Loan Amount after Refinancing



Sources: Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.

Note: Estimates include conventional mortgages only.


Cash-out Refi Share of All Originations



Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

Note: Data as of July 2019.

Equity Take-Out from Conventional Mortgage Refinance Activity



Sources: Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.


Note: Estimates include conventional mortgages only.

OVERVIEW

AGENCY NONBANK ORIGINATION SHARE


The nonbank origination share has been rising steadily for all three agencies since 2013. The Ginnie Mae nonbank share has been consistently higher than the GSEs, falling slightly to 84 percent in August 2019, just below its record high of 86 percent in May. Freddie and Fannie's nonbank shares also fell in August, to 42 and 53 percent respectively (note that these numbers can be volatile on a month-to-month basis.) Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac all have higher nonbank origination shares for refi activity than for purchase activity.

Nonbank Origination Share: All Loans




Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

Nonbank Origination Share: Purchase Loans



Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

Nonbank Origination Share: Refi Loans




Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

OVERVIEW

SECURITIZATION VOLUME AND COMPOSITION

Agency/Non-Agency Share of Residential MBS Issuance


The non-agency share of mortgage securitizations has increased gradually over the post-crisis years, from 1.8 percent in 2016 to 7.4 percent in 2018. It fell slightly, to 5.21 percent, as of August 2019. Non-agency securitization volume totaled \$36.52 billion for 1H 2019, lower than the \$45.97 billion in 1H 2018, with a change in the mix. Alt-A and subprime securitizations have grown, while scratch and dent securitizations have fallen by about half their size since the same period last year. Non-agency securitizations continue to be tiny compared to pre-crisis levels.



Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute.


Note: Based on data from August 2019. Monthly non-agency volume is subject to revision.

Non-Agency MBS Issuance



Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute.

Monthly Non-Agency Securitization




Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute.

CREDIT BOX

HOUSING CREDIT AVAILABILITY INDEX


The Urban Institute's Housing Credit Availability Index (HCAI) assesses lenders' tolerance for both borrower risk and product risk, calculating the share of owner-occupied purchase loans that are likely to go 90+ days delinquent over the life of the loan. The latest HCAI shows that mortgage credit availability increased to 5.95 percent in the first quarter of 2019 (Q1 2019), up marginally from 5.75% the previous quarter. This is the highest level since 2013. This quarter's increase was caused by an increase in risk taken in the portfolio and private-label securities channel. Credit also expanded in both the GSE and government channels, but by a smaller margin. More information about the HCAI is available [here](#).

All Channels



GSE Channel

The GSE market has expanded the credit box for borrowers more effectively than the government channel has in recent years. The downward trend of credit availability in the GSE channel began a reversal in Q2 2011. From Q2 2011 to Q1 2019, the total risk taken by the GSE channel has more than doubled, from 1.4 percent to 3.1 percent.



Sources: eMBS, CoreLogic, HMDA, IMF, and Urban Institute.

Note: Default is defined as 90 days or more delinquent at any point. Last updated July 2019.


Q1 2019

CREDIT BOX

HOUSING CREDIT AVAILABILITY INDEX


Government Channel

The total default risk the government loan channel is willing to take bottomed out at 9.6 percent in Q3 2013. In the past ten quarters starting in Q4 2016, the risk in the government channel has increased from 9.9 to 12.1 percent, the highest level since 2009, but still around half the pre-bubble level of 19 – 23 percent.



Portfolio and Private Label Securities Channels

The portfolio and private-label securities (PP) channel took on more product risk than the government and GSE channels during the bubble. After the crisis, PP channel's product and borrower risks dropped sharply. The numbers have stabilized since 2013, with product risk fluctuating below 0.6 percent and borrower risk around 2.0 percent. Borrower risk increased in the first quarter of 2019, reaching 3.1 percent, driven primarily by a decline in FICO scores and an increase in high-LTV lending.



Sources: eMBS, CoreLogic, HMDA, IMF, and Urban Institute.

Note: Default is defined as 90 days or more delinquent at any point. Last updated July 2019.

CREDIT BOX


CREDIT AVAILABILITY FOR PURCHASE LOANS

Access to credit remains tight, especially for lower FICO borrowers. The median FICO for current purchase loans is about 33 points higher than the pre-crisis level of around 700. The 10th percentile, which represents the lower bound of creditworthiness to qualify for a mortgage, was 641 in June 2019, compared to low-600s pre-bubble. The median LTV at origination of 95 percent remains relatively high, reflecting the rise of FHA and VA lending. Although current median DTI of 40 percent exceeds the pre-bubble level of 36 percent, higher FICO scores serve as a strong compensating factor.

— Mean — 90th percentile — 10th percentile — Median


Borrower FICO Score at Origination

FICO Score




Combined LTV at Origination

LTV



DTI at Origination

DTI



Sources: Black Knight, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA, CoreLogic and Urban Institute.


Note: Includes owner-occupied purchase loans only. DTI data prior to April 2018 is from CoreLogic; after that date, it is from Black Knight. Data as of June 2019.

CREDIT BOX

CREDIT AVAILABILITY BY MSA FOR PURCHASE LOANS

Credit has been tight for all borrowers with less-than-stellar credit scores—especially in MSAs with high housing prices. For example, the mean origination FICO for borrowers in San Francisco-Redwood City-South San Francisco, CA is 775. Across all MSAs, lower average FICO scores tend to be correlated with high average LTVs, as these MSAs rely heavily on FHA/VA financing.

Origination FICO and LTV



Sources: Black Knight, eMBS, HMDA, SIFMA and Urban Institute.


Note: Includes owner-occupied purchase loans only. Data as of June 2019.

CREDIT BOX

AGENCY NONBANK CREDIT BOX


Nonbank originators have played a key role in opening access to credit. Median GSE and Ginnie Mae FICO scores for nonbank originations are lower than their bank counterparts, with a larger differential in the Ginnie Mae market. Within the GSE space, bank FICO scores have declined slightly since 2014 and nonbank FICO scores are up slightly. By contrast, for Ginnie Mae originations, FICO scores for bank originations rose while nonbank FICO scores fell since 2014, reflecting a sharp cut-back in FHA lending by many banks. As pointed out on page 11, banks comprise only about 15 percent of Ginnie Mae originations. Many banks temporarily relaxed their overlays in Spring 2019, causing FICO scores to drift down to 690 in April '19. Since May '19, Ginnie Mae Bank FICO scores have increased to 699, a level last seen in late 2018.

Agency FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank




Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

GSE FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank



Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

Ginnie Mae FICO: Bank vs. Nonbank




Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

CREDIT BOX

AGENCY NONBANK CREDIT BOX


The median LTVs for nonbank and bank originations are comparable, while the median DTI for nonbank loans is higher than for bank loans, indicating that nonbanks are more accommodating in both this and the FICO dimension. From early 2017 to early 2019, there was a sustained increase in DTIs, which has partially reversed in the past few months. This is true for both Ginnie Mae and the GSEs, for banks and nonbanks. As interest rates increased, DTIs rose, because borrower payments were driven up relative to incomes. With the fall in interest rates in 2019, DTIs have come down measurably, more so for banks.

GSE LTV: Bank vs. Nonbank




Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

Ginnie Mae LTV: Bank vs. Nonbank




Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

GSE DTI: Bank vs. Nonbank



Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

Ginnie Mae DTI: Bank vs. Nonbank



Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.

STATE OF THE MARKET

MORTGAGE ORIGINATION PROJECTIONS

With the drop in interest rates and concurrent rise in refinance activity in 2019, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the MBA estimate 2019 volume to be between \$1.9-\$2.0 trillion, higher than the \$1.64 trillion in 2018. This increased origination estimate follows drops in origination volumes, due to declining refinancing activity, over the past few years: 2018 was down from \$1.76-\$1.83 trillion in 2017, and 2017 was down from \$1.89-2.05 trillion in 2016.

Total Originations and Refinance Shares

Period	Originations (\$ billions)			Refi Share (percent)		
	Total, FNMA estimate	Total, FHLMC estimate	Total, MBA estimate	FNMA estimate	FHLMC estimate	MBA estimate
2018 Q1	410	377	342	38	40	37
2018 Q2	508	440	452	28	29	26
2018 Q3	465	435	457	26	25	24
2018 Q4	383	384	392	29	26	27
2019 Q1	349	355	325	31	36	30
2019 Q2	528	545	501	29	38	29
2019 Q3	600	617	605	41	49	38
2019 Q4	495	528	506	39	45	40
2015	1730	1750	1679	47	45	46
2016	2052	2125	1891	49	47	49
2017	1826	1807	1760	36	37	35
2018	1766	1636	1643	30	30	28
2019	1971	2045	1937	35	43	35
2020	1837	1823	1729	31	33	26


Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Mortgage Bankers Association and Urban Institute.

Note: Shaded boxes indicate forecasted figures. All figures are estimates for total single-family market. Regarding interest rates, the yearly averages for 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 were 3.9, 3.8, 4.0 and 4.6 percent. For 2019, the respective projections for Fannie, Freddie, and MBA are 3.9, 3.9, and 3.7 percent.

Originator Profitability and Unmeasured Costs

In August 2019, Originator Profitability and Unmeasured Costs (OPUC) stood at \$2.62 per \$100 loan, much lower than the 2013 peak, but still up from the final months of 2018. OPUC, formulated and calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, is a good relative measure of originator profitability. OPUC uses the sales price of a mortgage in the secondary market (less par) and adds two sources of profitability; retained servicing (both base and excess servicing, net of g-fees), and points paid by the borrower. OPUC is generally high when interest rates are low, as originators are capacity constrained due to refinance demand and have no incentive to reduce rates. Conversely, when interest rates are higher and refi activity low, competition forces originators to lower rates, driving profitability down.

Dollars per \$100 loan



Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, updated monthly and available at this link:

<http://www.ny.frb.org/research/epr/2013/1113fust.html> and Urban Institute.

Note: OPUC is a monthly (4-week moving) average as discussed in [Fuster et al. \(2013\)](#).

STATE OF THE MARKET

HOUSING SUPPLY

Strong demand for housing in recent years, coupled with historically low new home construction has led to a low, 4.1 months, supply of for-sale homes in August 2019. This level is marginally lower than the 4.3 months in August 2018. Pre-crisis it averaged 4.6 months. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the MBA and the NAHB forecast 2019 housing starts to be 1.24 to 1.27 million units, very similar to 2018. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the MBA predict total home sales of 5.9 to 6.1 million units in 2019, slightly outpacing (Fannie Mae, MBA) or roughly flat (Freddie Mac) from 2018. The NAHB predicts homes sales to fall by about 64,000 units in 2019.

Months of Supply

Months of supply



August 2019

Source: National Association of Realtors and Urban Institute.

Housing Starts and Homes Sales

Year	Housing Starts, thousands				Home Sales, thousands			
	Total, FNMA estimate	Total, FHLMC estimate	Total, MBA estimate	Total, NAHB estimate	Total, FNMA estimate	Total, FHLMC estimate	Total, MBA estimate	Total, NAHB estimate
2015	1112	1110	1108	1107	5751	5750	5740	5125
2016	1174	1170	1177	1177	6011	6010	6001	5385
2017	1203	1200	1208	1208	6123	6120	6158	5523
2018	1250	1250	1250	1249	5957	5960	5958	5359
2019	1241	1250	1265	1243	5990	5940	6053	5295
2020	1234	1280	1270	1286	6038	6040	6163	5331

Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, National Association of Home Builders and Urban Institute.


Note: Shaded boxes indicate forecasted figures; column labels indicate source of estimate. NAHB home sales estimate is for single-family structures only, it excludes condos and co-ops. Other figures include all single-family sales.

STATE OF THE MARKET

HOUSING AFFORDABILITY


National Mortgage Affordability Over Time

Home prices remain affordable by historic standards, despite price increases over the last 7 years, as interest rates remain relatively low in an historic context. As of August 2019, with a 20 percent down payment, the share of median income needed for the monthly mortgage payment stood at 22.2 percent; with 3.5 down, it is 25.5 percent. Since February, the median housing expenses to income ratio has been slightly lower than the 2001-2003 average. As shown in the bottom picture, mortgage affordability varies widely by MSA.



Mortgage Affordability by MSA

Mortgage affordability index



Sources: National Association of Realtors, US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, American Community Survey, Moody's Analytics, Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey, and the Urban Institute.

Note: Mortgage affordability is the share of median family income devoted to the monthly principal, interest, taxes, and insurance payment required to buy the median home at the Freddie Mac prevailing rate 2018 for a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage and property tax and insurance at 1.75 percent of the housing value. Data for the bottom chart as of Q4 2018.


STATE OF THE MARKET

HOME PRICE INDICES

National Year-Over-Year HPI Growth

Year-over-year home price appreciation slowed slightly in July 2019, as measured by Zillow's hedonic index, but remained steady according to Black Knight's repeat sales index. Although housing affordability remains constrained, especially at the lower end of the market, recent declines in rates serve as a partial offset. We would expect the lower end of the market to continue to appreciate more than the upper end, as low-end inventory is very tight.

Year-over-year growth



Sources: Black Knight, Zillow, and Urban Institute. Note: Data as of July 2019.

Changes in Black Knight HPI for Top MSAs

After rising 54.7 percent from the trough, national house prices are now 15.3 percent higher than pre-crisis peak levels. At the MSA level, ten of the top 15 MSAs have exceeded their pre-crisis peak HPI: New York, NY; Los Angeles, CA; Atlanta, GA; Houston, TX; Dallas, TX; Minneapolis, MN; Seattle, WA; Denver, CO, San Diego, CA, and Anaheim, CA. Two MSAs particularly hard hit by the boom and bust—Chicago, IL and Riverside, CA—are 8.8 and 8.9 percent, respectively, below peak values.

MSA	HPI changes (%)			% above peak
	2000 to peak	Peak to trough	Trough to current	
United States	75.5	-25.5	54.7	15.3
New York-Jersey City-White Plains, NY-NJ	127.9	-22.4	44.4	12.1
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA	179.9	-38.1	85.0	14.5
Chicago-Naperville-Arlington Heights, IL	67.0	-38.4	48.0	-8.8
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA	32.5	-35.6	81.0	16.5
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV	149.4	-28.4	36.7	-2.1
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX	29.4	-6.6	48.3	38.6
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ	113.2	-51.1	93.3	-5.5
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA	175.3	-51.7	88.4	-8.9
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX	26.4	-7.2	67.2	55.2
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI	69.3	-30.3	61.4	12.5
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA	90.5	-33.1	104.2	36.7
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO	34.0	-12.1	93.0	69.7
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD	123.4	-24.3	23.7	-6.3
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA	148.4	-37.5	77.1	10.7
Anaheim-Santa Ana-Irvine, CA	163.3	-35.3	64.1	6.2

Sources: Black Knight HPI and Urban Institute. Data as of July 2019.


Note: This table includes the largest 15 Metropolitan areas by mortgage count.

STATE OF THE MARKET

FIRST-TIME HOMEBUYERS

First-Time Homebuyer Share

In June 2019, the FTHB share for FHA, which has always been more focused on first time homebuyers, fell very slightly to 83.1 percent. The FTHB share of VA lending also fell in June, to 53.6 percent. The GSE FTHB share in June was 47.9 percent. The bottom table shows that based on mortgages originated in June 2019, the average FTHB was more likely than an average repeat buyer to take out a smaller loan, have a lower credit score, and higher LTV and higher DTI, thus paying a higher interest rate.



Sources: eMBS, Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Urban Institute.

June 2019

Note: All series measure the first-time homebuyer share of purchase loans for principal residences.

Comparison of First-Time and Repeat Homebuyers, GSE and FHA Originations

Characteristics	GSEs		FHA		GSEs and FHA	
	First-time	Repeat	First-time	Repeat	First-time	Repeat
Loan Amount (\$)	247,147	275,751	217,901	238,428	235,985	270,678
Credit Score	742	757	668	673	714	745
LTV (%)	88	80	96	94	91	81
DTI (%)	35	36	43	44	38	37
Loan Rate (%)	4.3	4.21	4.46	4.36	4.36	4.23

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.


Note: Based on owner-occupied purchase mortgages originated in June 2019.

STATE OF THE MARKET

DELINQUENCIES AND LOSS MITIGATION ACTIVITY

Loans in and near negative equity continued to decline in 2Q 2019; 3.8 percent now have negative equity, an additional 0.9 percent have less than 5 percent equity. Loans that are 90 days delinquent or in foreclosure have also been in a long decline, falling to 1.95 percent in the second quarter of 2019. New loan modifications and liquidations (bottom) have continued to decline. Since Q3, 2007, total loan modifications (HAMP and proprietary) are roughly equal to total liquidations. Hope Now reports show 8,582,314 borrowers received a modification from Q3 2007 to Q1 2019, compared with 8,807,889 liquidations in the same period.


Negative Equity Share



Sources: CoreLogic and Urban Institute.

Note: Loans with negative equity refer to loans above 100 percent LTV. Loans near negative equity refer to loans above 95 percent LTV. Last updated September 2019.


Loans in Serious Delinquency/Foreclosure



Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association and Urban Institute. Last updated August 2019.

Loan Modifications and Liquidations

Number of loans (thousands)



Sources: Hope Now and Urban Institute.


Note: Liquidations include both foreclosure sales and short sales. Last updated June 2019.

GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP

GSE PORTFOLIO WIND-DOWN


Both GSEs continue to contract their retained portfolios. Since July 2018, Fannie Mae has contracted by 21.1 percent and Freddie Mac by 10.4 percent. They are shrinking their less-liquid assets (mortgage loans and non-agency MBS) faster than they are shrinking their entire portfolio. The Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac portfolios are now both well below the \$250 billion maximum portfolio size; they were required to reach this terminal level by year end 2018. Fannie met the target in 2017, Freddie met the target in February 2018.

Fannie Mae Mortgage-Related Investment Portfolio Composition



July 2019

Freddie Mac Mortgage-Related Investment Portfolio Composition



July 2019


GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP

EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE FEES

Guarantee Fees Charged on New Acquisitions

Fannie Mae's 2019 10-Q indicates that its average g-fees charged on new acquisitions fell from 60.4 to 56.7 bps in Q2 2019, while Freddie rose from 50.0 to 54.0. These are markedly higher than g-fee levels in 2011 and 2012, and have contributed to the GSEs' earnings. The GSE's latest Loan-Level Pricing Adjustments (LLPAs) took effect in September 2015; the bottom table shows the Fannie Mae LLPAs, which are expressed as upfront charges.

Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mae and Urban Institute.
Last updated August 2019.



Fannie Mae Upfront Loan-Level Price Adjustments (LLPAs)

Credit Score	LTV (%)								
	≤60	60.01 - 70	70.01 - 75	75.01 - 80	80.01 - 85	85.01 - 90	90.01 - 95	95.01 - 97	>97
> 740	0.00	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.75	0.75
720 - 739	0.00	0.25	0.50	0.75	0.50	0.50	0.50	1.00	1.00
700 - 719	0.00	0.50	1.00	1.25	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.50	1.50
680 - 699	0.00	0.50	1.25	1.75	1.50	1.25	1.25	1.50	1.50
660 - 679	0.00	1.00	2.25	2.75	2.75	2.25	2.25	2.25	2.25
640 - 659	0.50	1.25	2.75	3.00	3.25	2.75	2.75	2.75	2.75
620 - 639	0.50	1.50	3.00	3.00	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.50	3.50
< 620	0.50	1.50	3.00	3.00	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.75	3.75
Product Feature (Cumulative)									
Investment Property	2.125	2.125	2.125	3.375	4.125	4.125	4.125	4.125	4.125

Sources: Fannie Mae and Urban Institute.
Last updated March of 2019.

GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP

GSE RISK-SHARING TRANSACTIONS

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been laying off back-end credit risk through CAS and STACR deals and through reinsurance transactions. They have also done front-end transactions with originators and reinsurers, and experimented with deep mortgage insurance coverage with private mortgage insurers. FHFA's 2019 scorecard requires the GSEs to lay off credit risk on 90 percent of newly acquired loans in categories targeted for transfer. Fannie Mae's CAS issuances since inception total \$1.294 trillion; Freddie's STACR totals \$1.302 trillion.

Fannie Mae – Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS)

Date	Transaction	Reference Pool Size (\$ m)	Amount Issued (\$m)	% of Reference Pool Covered
2013	CAS 2013 deals	\$26,756	\$675	2.5
2014	CAS 2014 deals	\$227,234	\$5,849	2.6
2015	CAS 2015 deals	\$187,126	\$5,463	2.9
2016	CAS 2016 deals	\$236,459	\$7,392	3.1
2017	CAS 2017 deals	\$264,697	\$8,707	3.3
February 2018	CAS 2018 - C01	\$44,900	\$1,494	3.3
March 2018	CAS 2018 - C02	\$26,500	\$1,007	3.8
May 2018	CAS 2018 - C03	\$31,100	\$1,050	3.4
June 2018	CAS 2018 - C04	\$24,700	\$940	3.8
July 2018	CAS 2018 - C05	\$28,700	\$983	3.4
October 2018	CAS 2018 - C06	\$25,700	\$918	3.6
October 2018	CAS 2018 - R07	\$24,300	\$922	3.8
January 2019	CAS 2019 - R01	\$28,000	\$960	3.4
February 2019	CAS 2019 - R02	\$27,000	\$1,000	3.7
April 2019	CAS 2019 - R03	\$21,000	\$857	4.1
June 2019	CAS 2019 - R04	\$25,000	\$1,000	4.0
July 2019	CAS 2019 - R05	\$24,000	\$993	4.1
Total		\$1,294,172	\$40,210	3.1

Freddie Mac – Structured Agency Credit Risk (STACR)

Date	Transaction	Reference Pool Size (\$ m)	Amount Issued (\$m)	% of Reference Pool Covered
2013	STACR 2013 deals	\$57,912	\$1,130	2.0
2014	STACR 2014 deals	\$147,120	\$4,916	3.3
2015	STACR 2015 deals	\$209,521	\$6,658	3.2
2016	STACR 2016 deals	\$199,130	\$5,541	2.8
2017	STACR 2017 deals	\$248,821	\$5,663	2.3
January 2018	STACR Series 2018 - DNA1	\$34,733	\$900	2.6
March 2018	STACR Series 2018 - HQA1	\$40,102	\$985	2.5
June 2018	STACR Series 2018 - DNA2	\$49,346	\$1,050	2.1
September 2018	STACR Series 2018 - DNA3	\$30,000	\$820	2.7
October 2018	STACR Series 2018 - HQA2	\$36,200	\$1,000	2.8
November 2018	STACR Series 2018 - HRP2	\$26,200	\$1,300	5.0
January 2019	STACR Series 2019 - DNA1	\$24,600	\$714	2.9
February 2019	STACR Series 2019 - HQA1	\$20,760	\$640	3.1
March 2019	STACR Series 2019 - DNA2	\$20,500	\$608	3.0
May 2019	STACR Series 2019 - HQA2	\$19,500	\$615	3.2
May 2019	STACR Series 2019 - FTR1	\$44,590	\$140	0.3
June 2019	STACR Series 2019 - HRP1	\$5,782	\$281	4.9
July 2019	STACR Series 2019 - DNA3	\$25,533	\$756	3.0
August 2019	STACR Series 2019 - FTR2	\$11,511	\$284	2.5
Total		\$1,302,927	\$34,001	2.6


Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute. **Note:** Classes A-H, M-1H, M-2H, and B-H are reference tranches only. These classes are not issued or sold. The risk is retained by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. "CE" = credit enhancement.

GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP


GSE RISK-SHARING INDICES

The figures below show the spreads on the 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 indices, as priced by dealers. Note that the older indices (2015 and 2016) skyrocketed this summer, before stabilizing, while the newer indices have increased much less. This reflects the fact that the older indices have narrowed since issuance, and hence are at considerable price premiums. The drop in interest rates has generated faster prepayment speeds; spreads have widened to compensate investors for a loss in the value of their premium bonds. Note that the 2015 and 2016 indices consist of the bottom mezzanine tranche in each deal, weighted by the original issuance amount; the equity tranches were not sold in these years. The 2017 and 2018 indices contain both the bottom mezzanine tranche as well as the equity tranche (the B tranche), in all deals when the latter was sold.


By Vintage




2017 and 2018 Indices



Low Indices



High Indices




Sources: Vista Data Services and Urban Institute.
 Note: Data as of September 13, 2019.

GSES UNDER CONSERVATORSHIP

SERIOUS DELINQUENCY RATES


Serious delinquencies for single-family GSE, FHA, and VA loans declined in 2018 and this trend continued in the second quarter of 2019. GSE delinquencies are now in line with 2005-2007 levels, while FHA and VA delinquencies (which are higher than their GSE counterparts) are at levels lower than 2005-2007. GSE multifamily delinquencies have declined post-crisis and remain very low.

Serious Delinquency Rates—Single-Family Loans



Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, MBA Delinquency Survey and Urban Institute. **Note:** Serious delinquency is defined as 90 days or more past due or in the foreclosure process. Not seasonally adjusted. FHA and VA delinquencies are reported on a quarterly basis, last updated August 2019. GSE delinquencies are reported monthly, last updated September of 2019.

Serious Delinquency Rates—Multifamily GSE Loans



Sources: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Urban Institute.

Note: Multifamily serious delinquency rate is the unpaid balance of loans 60 days or more past due, divided by the total unpaid balance.

AGENCY ISSUANCE

AGENCY GROSS AND

NET ISSUANCE

Agency gross issuance was \$879.1 billion in the first eight months of 2019, up 9.7 percent from the same period in 2018. Issuance in January and February 2019 was much lower than in January and February 2018, however April through August has outpaced the previous year. Net issuance (which excludes repayments, prepayments, and refinances on outstanding mortgages) totaled \$186.8 billion in the first eight months of 2019, or \$280.3 billion on an annualized basis, up 13.3 percent from the same period in 2018.

Agency Gross Issuance

Agency Net Issuance

Issuance Year	GSEs	Ginnie Mae	Total	Issuance Year	GSEs	Ginnie Mae	Total
2000	\$360.6	\$102.2	\$462.8	2000	\$159.80	\$29.30	\$189.10
2001	\$885.1	\$171.5	\$1,056.6	2001	\$368.40	-\$9.90	\$358.50
2002	\$1,238.9	\$169.0	\$1,407.9	2002	\$357.20	-\$51.20	\$306.10
2003	\$1,874.9	\$213.1	\$2,088.0	2003	\$334.90	-\$77.60	\$257.30
2004	\$872.6	\$119.2	\$991.9	2004	\$82.50	-\$40.10	\$42.40
2005	\$894.0	\$81.4	\$975.3	2005	\$174.20	-\$42.20	\$132.00
2006	\$853.0	\$76.7	\$929.7	2006	\$313.60	\$0.20	\$313.80
2007	\$1,066.2	\$94.9	\$1,161.1	2007	\$514.90	\$30.90	\$545.70
2008	\$911.4	\$267.6	\$1,179.0	2008	\$314.80	\$196.40	\$511.30
2009	\$1,280.0	\$451.3	\$1,731.3	2009	\$250.60	\$257.40	\$508.00
2010	\$1,003.5	\$390.7	\$1,394.3	2010	-\$303.20	\$198.30	-\$105.00
2011	\$879.3	\$315.3	\$1,194.7	2011	-\$128.40	\$149.60	\$21.20
2012	\$1,288.8	\$405.0	\$1,693.8	2012	-\$42.40	\$119.10	\$76.80
2013	\$1,176.6	\$393.6	\$1,570.1	2013	\$69.10	\$87.90	\$157.00
2014	\$650.9	\$296.3	\$947.2	2014	\$30.50	\$61.60	\$92.10
2015	\$845.7	\$436.3	\$1,282.0	2015	\$75.10	\$97.30	\$172.50
2016	\$991.6	\$508.2	\$1,499.8	2016	\$135.50	\$126.10	\$261.60
2017	\$877.3	\$455.6	\$1,332.9	2017	\$168.50	\$131.30	\$299.70
2018	\$795.0	\$400.6	\$1,195.3	2018	\$147.70	\$113.90	\$261.60
2019 YTD	\$587.9	\$291.2	\$879.1	2019 YTD	\$120.1	\$66.8	\$186.8
2019 YTD % Change YOY	10.9%	7.1%	9.7%	2019 YTD % Change YOY	33.0%	-10.6%	13.3%
2019 Ann.	\$881.9	\$436.8	\$1,318.7	2019 Ann.	\$180.1	\$100.1	\$280.3

Sources: eMBS and Urban Institute.


Note: Dollar amounts are in billions. Data as of August 2019.

AGENCY ISSUANCE

AGENCY GROSS ISSUANCE & FED PURCHASES

Monthly Gross Issuance

While FHA, VA and GSE lending have dominated the mortgage market since the crisis, there has been a change in the mix. The Ginnie Mae share of new issuances has risen from a precrisis level of 10-12 percent to 29.7 percent in August 2019. This share increase reflected both increases in the purchase share and in the refi share. More precisely, when interest rates rose, there was a proportionately sharper curtailment in GSE refis than in Ginnie Mae refis. The recent drop in rates has not been large enough to alter that pattern.




Sources: eMBS, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Urban Institute.

August 2019

Fed Absorption of Agency Gross Issuance

The Fed is winding down its MBS portfolio; new MBS purchases are minimal. During the period October 2014 to September 2017, the Fed ended its purchase program, but was reinvesting funds from mortgages and agency debt into the mortgage market, absorbing 20-30 percent of agency gross issuance. The portfolio wind down started in October 2017, with the Fed allowing a pre-established amount of MBS to run off each month. From October 2017 to September 2018, the Fed was still reinvesting, but by less than the prepayments and repayments. In October 2018, the amount of MBS permitted to run off each month (MBS taper) hit the \$20 billion cap. Since then the amount of Fed purchases has been tiny; in August 2019 Fed purchases totaled \$3.8 billion, corresponding to Fed absorption of gross issuance of 2.18 percent.



Sources: eMBS, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Urban Institute.


August 2019

AGENCY ISSUANCE

MORTGAGE INSURANCE ACTIVITY


MI Activity

Mortgage insurance activity via the FHA, VA and private insurers increased from \$183 billion in Q2 2018 to \$188 billion in Q2 2019, a 2.9 percent increase. In the second quarter of 2019, private mortgage insurance written increased by \$28.31 billion, FHA increased by \$13.44 billion and VA increased by \$12.17 billion from the previous quarter, reflecting seasonal increases driven by busy spring homebuying. During this period, the VA share fell slightly from 23.8 to 23.4 percent and the FHA share similarly fell from 31.7 to 28.8 percent, while the private mortgage insurers share grew from 44.5 to 46.8 percent compared to the previous quarter.



Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute. Last updated July 2019.

MI Market Share



Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance and Urban Institute. Last updated July 2019.

AGENCY ISSUANCE

MORTGAGE INSURANCE ACTIVITY

FHA premiums rose significantly in the years following the housing crash, with annual premiums rising from 50 to 135 basis points between 2008 to 2013 as FHA worked to shore up its finances. In January 2015, President Obama announced a 50 bps cut in annual insurance premiums, making FHA mortgages more attractive than GSE mortgages for the overwhelming majority of high LTV borrowers. The April 2016 reduction in PMI rates for borrowers with higher FICO scores and April 2018 reduction for lower FICO borrowers has partially offset that. As shown in the bottom table, a borrower putting 3.5 percent down will now find FHA more economical except for those with FICO scores of 720 or higher.

FHA MI Premiums for Typical Purchase Loan

Case number date	Upfront mortgage insurance premium (UFMIP) paid	Annual mortgage insurance premium (MIP)
1/1/2001 - 7/13/2008	150	50
7/14/2008 - 4/5/2010*	175	55
4/5/2010 - 10/3/2010	225	55
10/4/2010 - 4/17/2011	100	90
4/18/2011 - 4/8/2012	100	115
4/9/2012 - 6/10/2012	175	125
6/11/2012 - 3/31/2013 ^a	175	125
4/1/2013 - 1/25/2015 ^b	175	135
Beginning 1/26/2015 ^c	175	85

Sources: Ginnie Mae and Urban Institute.

Note: A typical purchase loan has an LTV over 95 and a loan term longer than 15 years. Mortgage insurance premiums are listed in basis points.

* For a short period in 2008 the FHA used a risk based FICO/LTV matrix for MI.

^a Applies to purchase loans less than or equal to \$625,500. Those over that amount have an annual premium of 150 bps.

^b Applies to purchase loans less than or equal to \$625,500. Those over that amount have an annual premium of 155 bps.

^c Applies to purchase loans less than or equal to \$625,500. Those over that amount have an annual premium of 105 bps.

Initial Monthly Payment Comparison: FHA vs. PMI

Assumptions	
Property Value	\$250,000
Loan Amount	\$241,250
LTV	96.5
Base Rate	
Conforming	3.62
FHA	3.84

FICO	620 - 639	640 - 659	660 - 679	680 - 699	700 - 719	720 - 739	740 - 759	760 +
FHA MI Premiums								
FHA UFMIP	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75	1.75
FHA MIP	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85
PMI								
GSE LPA*	3.50	2.75	2.25	1.50	1.50	1.00	0.75	0.75
PMI Annual MIP	1.86	1.65	1.54	1.21	0.99	0.87	0.70	0.58
Monthly Payment								
FHA	\$1,320	\$1,320	\$1,320	\$1,320	\$1,320	\$1,320	\$1,320	\$1,320
PMI	\$1,571	\$1,507	\$1,471	\$1,384	\$1,340	\$1,302	\$1,261	\$1,237
PMI Advantage	-\$250	-\$187	-\$151	-\$64	-\$19	\$18	\$60	\$84

Sources: Genworth Mortgage Insurance, Ginnie Mae, and Urban Institute.

Note: Rates as of August 2019.

Mortgage insurance premiums listed in percentage points. Grey shade indicates FHA monthly payment is more favorable, while blue indicates PMI is more favorable. The PMI monthly payment calculation does not include special programs like Fannie Mae's HomeReady and Freddie Mac's Home Possible (HP), both offer more favorable rates for low- to moderate-income borrowers.

LLPA= Loan Level Price Adjustment, described in detail on page 25.

RELATED HFPC WORK

PUBLICATIONS AND EVENTS

Upcoming events:

See our [events page](#) for information on upcoming events.

Projects

[The Mortgage Servicing Collaborative](#)

[Housing Credit Availability Index \(HCAI\)](#)

[Access and Affordability](#)

[Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Projects](#)

Features

[Housing Affordability Is a Big Problem. Small-Dollar Mortgages Could Help.](#)

Authors: Sarah Strochak and Alanna McCargo

Date: June 18, 2019

Publications

[Comment Letter to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau on the Qualified Mortgage Rule](#)

Authors: Karan Kaul, Laurie Goodman, Jun Zhu

Date: September 17, 2019

[HUD's Proposal to Revise the Disparate Impact Standard Will Impede Efforts to Close the Homeownership Gap](#)

Authors: Michelle Aronowitz, Edward Golding

Date: September 6, 2019

[The Community Reinvestment Act: What Do We Know, and What Do We Need to Know?](#)

Authors: Laurie Goodman, Jun Zhu, John Walsh

Date: August 30, 2019

[Senior Housing and Mobility: Recent Trends and Implications for the Housing Market](#)

Authors: Jung Hyun Choi, Laurie Goodman, Jun Zhu, John Walsh

Date: August 30, 2019

[FinTech Innovation in the Home Purchase and Financing Market](#)

Authors: Jung Hyun Choi, Karan Kaul, Laurie Goodman

Date: July 15, 2019

[Fast Prepayments of VA Mortgages Are Increasing Costs to Veteran and FHA Mortgage Borrowers](#)

Authors: Laurie Goodman, Edward Golding, Michael Neal

Date: June 19, 2019

Blog Posts

[Three Ways Fintech Is Changing Homebuying—And Three Important Questions](#)

Authors: Jung Hyun Choi, Karan Kaul, Laurie Goodman

Date: September 17, 2019

[How Debt Burden Affects FHA Mortgage Repayment, in Six Charts](#)

Authors: Laurie Goodman, Edward Golding, Jun Zhu

Date: September 12, 2019

[The Surge of Investors in Single-Family Homes Raises Three Concerns](#)

Authors: Ellen Seidman, Sheryl Pardo

Date: August 27, 2019

[Mortgage Debt Has Peaked. Why Has the Share of Homeowners with a Mortgage Fallen to a 13-Year Low?](#)

Authors: Michael Neal

Date: August 20, 2019

[FHA's Distressed Asset Stabilization Program Should Be Improved, Not Abandoned](#)

Authors: Laurie Goodman, Edward Golding, Jim Parrott

Date: August 14, 2019

[Mapping the Hispanic Homeownership Gap](#)

Authors: Sarah Strochak, Caitlin Young, Alanna McCargo

Date: August 12, 2019

[Single Security Helps Today's Housing Finance System and Lays the Groundwork for Tomorrow's](#)

Authors: Karan Kaul, Laurie Goodman

Date: August 2, 2019

[These Five Facts Reveal the Current Crisis in Black Homeownership](#)

Authors: Caitlin Young

Date: July 31, 2019

[Private Mortgage Insurance Reduces the Severity of Losses for Those Holding Risk](#)

Authors: Laurie Goodman, Jun Zhu

Date: June 26, 2019

[If FHA Wants to Bring Lenders Back, It Will Need to Clarify Their False Claims Act Liability](#)

Authors: Jim Parrott, Laurie Goodman

Date: June 11, 2019

Acknowledgments

The Housing Finance Policy Center (HFPC) was launched with generous support at the leadership level from the Citi Foundation and John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Additional support was provided by The Ford Foundation and The Open Society Foundations.

Ongoing support for HFPC is also provided by the Housing Finance Innovation Forum, a group of organizations and individuals that support high-quality independent research that informs evidence-based policy development. Funds raised through the Forum provide flexible resources, allowing HFPC to anticipate and respond to emerging policy issues with timely analysis. This funding supports HFPC's research, outreach and engagement, and general operating activities.

The chartbook is funded by these combined sources. We are grateful to them and to all our funders, who make it possible for Urban to advance its mission.

The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its funders. Funders do not determine research findings or the insights and recommendations of Urban experts. Further information on the Urban Institute's funding principles is available at www.urban.org/support.

Housing Finance Innovation Forum Members as of April 2019

Organizations

400 Capital Management
AGNC Investment Corp.
Arch Capital Group
Assurant
Bank of America
Caliber Home Loans
Citizens Bank
Ellington Management Group
FICO
Genworth Mortgage Insurance
Housing Policy Council
Ivory Homes
MGIC
Mortgage Bankers Association
Mr. Cooper
National Association of Home Builders
National Association of Realtors
Ocwen
Pretium Partners
Pulte Home Mortgage
Quicken Loans
RiskSpan
Two Harbors Investment Corp.
U.S. Mortgage Insurers
VantageScore
Wells Fargo

Individuals

Kenneth Bacon
Jay & Alanna McCargo
Mary Miller
Jim Millstein
Shekar Narasimhan
Faith Schwartz
Mark & Ava Zandi

Data Partners

Black Knight, Inc.
CoreLogic
Experian
First American
Moody's Analytics

Copyright June 2019. The Urban Institute. All rights reserved. Permission is granted for reproduction of this file, with attribution to the Urban Institute. The Urban Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan policy research and educational organization that examines the social, economic, and governance problems facing the nation.

